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INTRODUCTION
There is tension in the universe of entity property forms-tension between
the traditional conception of the residential leasehold interest and the expand-
ing property form known as the common-interest community. Common-
interest communities, a mix of both fee simple and tenancy in common prop-
erty, are distinguished by collective governance regimes that impose restrictions
on property owners through the use of ever-evolving covenants. These restric-
tions are determined, amended, and enforced through majoritarian governance,
such that these communities effectively form "private governments."' Condo-
miniums, the subject of this Note, are among the fastest growing forms of these
private governments.
Today, over 2.1 million condominium units are occupied by renters.2 Un-
like a traditional leasehold interest, whereby the lessee contracts with the lessor
to secure an interest in the latter's property subject to the terms of a static lease
agreement, lessees in a condominium are bound by the evolving decisions of the
ownership class. Renters, therefore, do not enjoy the "gatekeeper" role, tradi-
tionally understood, when renting a unit in a condominium. Ownership of real
property necessarily involves "decisions about resource use [that] are delegated
to an owner who acts as the manager or gatekeeper of the resource."3 Instead,
prospective lessees contract with the individual owner to lease only the space
within the four walls of a given unit. Renters then are subject to the varying
1. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 29 (1994); see also UNIF. COMMON INTEREST
OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102 cmt. 5 (1994) (stating that the condominium associa-
tion's ability to levy fines against unit owners and lessees "reflect[s] the need to
provide the association with sufficient powers to exercise its 'governmental' func-
tions as the ruling body of the common interest community").
2. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED
STATES: 2007, at 1-2 tbl.iA-i (2008) [hereinafter AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY],
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/20o8pubs/hl5o-o7.pdf.
3. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
29 (2007) (emphasis added).
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rules and interests governing the common areas of the condominium, such as
lobbies, hallways, pools, and even the property allowing them access to the unit,
like stairways and elevators. This is not problematic per se. When renters are
given inadequate notice regarding the covenants and governance regime to
which they will be subject, however-a regime in which they have no voice-
tensions arise.
This Note argues that tensions between residential leasehold interests and
ownership interests in condominium communities are exacerbated by the in-
creasing number of condominium units occupied by renters. It argues, in par-
ticular, that insufficient notice for renters regarding covenants, governance re-
gimes, and the legal treatment of condominium associations leads to an
inefficient allocation of renter preferences and an opportunity for associations
to impose exploitative covenants that disproportionately tax renters. This Note
advocates a robust statutory notice requirement to ensure that renters better
understand the implications of renting in a condominium, allowing them to ad-
just their market preferences accordingly. It is unacceptable for a statistically
significant percentage of Americans to enter into leases without knowing how
the condominium form, in comparison to the traditional leasehold interest, re-
stricts the use and enjoyment of their property and subjects them to the author-
ity and unpredictable preferences of their neighbors.
The scholarly literature concerning common-interest communities has not
focused on the challenges identified by this Note. Research instead has centered
on fundamental fairness and the constitutional implications of common-
interest communities as private governments, particularly the restriction of in-
dividual owners' rights.4 Robert Ellickson is among the few scholars to have
considered common-interest communities from an efficiency perspective;5
however, his work does not center on the tensions between the residential lea-
sehold and common-interest community property forms that are examined
here.
The issues identified in this Note are particularly important in light of cur-
rent developments in the housing market. Americans increasingly purchase
condominium units as a supplement to their primary residence-a trend that
catalyzed the collapse of the recent housing bubble.6 As a result, roughly one-
4. See Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government Should
Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (1992); Steven Siegel, The
Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional
Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1519 (1982).
6. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Is Concerned About 'Froth' in Housing,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2005, at C1 (finding that the rapid increase in the purchase of
condominiums and houses as investment properties, as opposed to second
homes, precipitated the mortgage crisis because people were "reaching" to finance
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third of American condominium units are occupied by renters.7 This Note ad-
vances the understanding of this under-theorized, but substantial, segment of
the American housing market: a segment with an inadequate understanding of
the unique legal constructs of condominium property results in inefficiencies
and, potentially, abuse.
Part I introduces the definitions, principles, governing law, and modern
history of the condominium property form. Part II presents the Note's thesis by
introducing the traditional conception of a residential leasehold property inter-
est as compared to the experience of renters in modern condominiums. Part II
also explains how these two property interests are in tension and how that ten-
sion can result in the inefficient allocation of renter preferences and the intro-
duction of exploitative policies on the part of the ownership class. Finally, Part
II argues that ex ante notice standards for prospective lessees currently are in-
sufficient. Part III examines the statutory landscape and locates the insufficiency
with which relevant legislation currently addresses the unique problems pre-
sented by renters, particularly with respect to notice requirements. The Conclu-
sion argues for a statutory notice requirement on behalf of prospective condo-
minium renters.
I. CONDOMINIUMS: BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES AND GOVERNING LAW
Condominiums are a relatively new property form. Although a limited
number of condominiums were built immediately after World War II, the
property form began to take root only after passage of the first condominium-
enabling statutes and the provision of federally backed mortgage insurance! Af-
ter Arkansas passed the nation's first enabling legislation in 1961, 9 the condo-
minium form of property ownership rapidly expanded across the country. By
1963, thirty-three more states had enacted condominium-enabling statutes, and
by 1967, forty-nine states had similar legislation.' The expansion of common-
interest communities, of which condominiums are the most common form,
was prodigious. Between 197o and 199o, the number of common-interest com-
munities increased from 10,000 to 150,000,11 with other statistics revealing a
their investments through the use of interest-only loans and adjustable-rate mort-
gages).
7. AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1-2 tbl.iA-i.
8. See Michael H. Schill, loan Voicu & Jonathan Miller, The Condominium Versus
Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. 275, 278 (2007).
9. 1 GARY A. POLIAKOFF, THE LAW OF CONDOMINIUM OPERATIONS § i.o8 (1988).
10. Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Effi-
ciency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 28 (1991).
11. See Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman, History and Structure of the Common
Interest Community, in COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: PRIVATE GOVERN-
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growth from fewer than 500 such communities in the early 196os to an esti-
mated 249,000 in 2003.2 Condominium units, virtually nonexistent in the early
196os, numbered over 4.2 million in 1987,"3 with over 7 million in existence to-
day.' 4
This Part briefly introduces the basic principles of the condominium form,
how condominiums are created, how they are governed, and the powers of gov-
erning bodies to enforce covenants upon unit owners. This Part also outlines
various sources of law that govern common-interest communities generally,
and condominiums specifically. It concludes with a discussion of the benefits of
the condominium form.
A. Basic Principles of the Condominium Form
The Restatement (Third) of Property defines a common-interest commu-
nity as "a real-estate development or neighborhood in which individually
owned lots or units are burdened by a servitude that imposes an obligation that
cannot be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal."' 5 "All common interest develop-
ments share several essential characteristics: common ownership of residential
property, mandatory membership of all owners in an association that governs
the use of the common property, and governing documents that provide a 'con-
stitution' by which the association and its members are governed."'6 Condo-
miniums are among the most common forms of these communities in America.
Although condominiums can differ in many respects, 7 they all share cer-
tain common characteristics. In a condominium, individuals own their respec-
tive units in fee simple, but they enjoy collective ownership in the common ar-
eas of the property-such as a hallway, lobby, or elevator-as tenants in
common.'" Owners individually finance their property through traditional
means (e.g., a mortgage) and are personally responsible for property taxes as-
MENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 10 (Stephen E. Barton & Carol J. Silverman
eds., 1994).
12. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 835.
13. MCKENZIE, supra note 1, at 96.
14. See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 2, at 1-2 tbl.iA-1.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000).
16. Barton & Silverman, supra note 11, at 3.
17. The physical attributes and use of a condominium structure determine the varie-
ties of condominiums. Condominiums may be high-rise buildings that are indis-
tinguishable from apartment complexes, a common feature of urban environ-
ments, or they may be detached, single-family homes organized as a
condominium community. See POLIAKOFF, supra note 9, § 1.05.
18. See id. § 1.1.
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sessed against the value of their ownership in the community 9 But they pay
collectively to maintain the common areas and provide for condominium-wide
services.2" The condominium form is particularly prevalent in metropolitan ar-
eas where land is at premium2 because it provides the "smallest tangible owner-
ship interest of any form of housing. It is essentially a legal way for people to
own, buy, and sell units in an apartment building."2
Condominiums, like all common-interest communities, are distinguished
by their complex system of servitudes and the governance structure designed to
amend and enforce the applicable covenants. Condominiums are governed by
an association, membership in which is a mandatory condition of purchasing a
unit in the condominium community. 3 Unlike a single-family homeowner who
exercises complete control over her real property, owners in a condominium
are subject in many respects to the collective will of the association. 4 Condo-
minium associations have the power to assess fees, set restrictions on the use
and enjoyment of property, and enforce community rules and standards. In
these respects condominium associations operate much like private, local gov-
ernments. 5 As one scholar has observed: "The owner of a condominium typi-
cally has an individual ownership interest that is a legal fiction, consisting of
just the 'airspace' inside the unit. The entire building and the ground on which
it sits are owned in common.2 6
i. Creating a Condominium
Common-interest communities often are created when a real estate devel-
oper constructs a residential property development that includes both individ-
ual lots or units and common property. 7 The developer, prior to selling indi-
vidual units, will impose a system of servitudes on the property and create a
19. Christopher S. Brennan, Note, The Next Step in the Evolution of the Implied War-
ranty of Habitability: Applying the Warranty to Condominiums, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3041, 3046 (1999).
20. See WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 271 (2d
ed. 2008).
21. See AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 2, at 34-35 tbl.lD-1.
22. MCKENZIE, supra note i, at 94.
23. See Barton & Silverman, supra note ii, at 3.
24. Lallo v. Szabo, No. 07-P-1513, 2009 WL 2516958, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 20,
2009) ("Condominium ownership is generally characterized by the relinquish-
ment of some 'personal choice' in exchange for the benefits that may be derived
from associating with other property owners.").
25. See MCKENZIE, supra note I, at 122-49.
26. Id. at 94.
27. See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 19.
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community association designed to govern and maintain the development in
accordance with the servitude regime." The developer, who at the outset con-
trols the association and retains management and enforcement authority, trans-
fers those responsibilities to the association at a designated time or when re-
quired by law.29 Typically, the formal conveyance of the common property
from the developer to the community association occurs when a certain per-
centage of lots or units have sold." In this respect, community associations are
an attractive investment exit strategy for developers. The developer can respond
to market demands by providing common amenities and services without hav-
ing to retain indefinite ownership or management responsibility over the prop-
erty.
Three legal documents are needed to create a condominium. First, the
"declaration" is the originating document of the condominium and its associa-
tion. Prior to the sale of any lots or units, a developer must create and, impor-
tantly, publicly record a declaration. The declaration includes a description of
the property, the servitude regime, the initial functions and powers of the asso-
ciation created pursuant to the declaration, and the obligation of unit purchas-
ers to belong to the association. 31 Recording the declaration serves an important
notice function, as conveyances to initial purchasers "should specify that the
conveyance is made subject to the recorded declaration. When the first lot or
unit is sold subject to the declaration, all the property described in the declara-
tion becomes bound by the terms .... "
Second, the Contract, Covenant, and Restrictions (CCR) document, usually
created as part of the declaration, is the primary source of duties binding com-
munity members.3 3 CCRs can be supplemented and amended over time in ac-
cordance with a community's governance mechanism. CCRs, together with the
third essential condominium document, the association bylaws, "set out restric-
tions on what the owners can and cannot do with their own and the common
property." 34 The topics covered by the CCRs and the bylaws, which are less
formal and easier to amend than the CCRs, can be exceptionally broad and of-
28. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-105 cmt. 5, 7 U.L.A. 250 (2008).
29. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 33.
30. Condominiums need not be created at the time of development. Apartment
buildings and cooperatives can be "converted" into condominiums. Id. at 38.
31. Id. at 32.
32. Id. at 33.
33. See Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and "Reasonableness" in Private Law:
The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 47-48
(1990).
34. Barton & Silverman, supra note ii, at 6.
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ten mirror the powers and duties of the condominium association and its man-
agement entity, the condominium board.35
2. The Functions, Powers, and Governing Structure of a Condomin-
ium Association
Condominium associations exercise an enormous amount of control over
the individual property units, common property, and the behavior of residents.
Association covenants and use restrictions govern issues such as parking, altera-
tions to individual units, pets, and even the outward appearance of units, such
as the color of residents' front doors. The Restatement (Third) of Property of-
fers an expansive definition of condominium association power predicated on
the notion that associations have near-plenary authority unless otherwise speci-
fied by statute:
In addition to the powers granted by statute and the governing docu-
ments, a common-interest community has the powers reasonably nec-
essary to manage the common property, administer the servitude re-
gime, and carry out other functions set forth in the declaration....
Except as otherwise specified by statute ... the community's powers
may be exercised by majority vote. 6
A famous case demonstrating the broad authority of an association is Nahrstedt
v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n,37 in which a condominium resident was denied
relief after the community association discovered cats in her unit in violation of
a recorded covenant. In denying Nahrstedt's challenge to the restrictive cove-
nant, the Supreme Court of California stated that "[g]enerally, courts will up-
hold decisions made by the governing board of an owners association so long as
they represent good-faith efforts to further the purposes of the common interest
development, are consistent with the development's governing documents, and
comply with public policy."38 Association authorities may restrict relatively su-
perficial aspects of unit ownership. Association powers also can impinge upon
what some consider fundamental incidents of property ownership, such as the
transfer of interests39 or the right to privacy.40
35. Condominium associations may be incorporated as nonprofit corporations, in
which case they must file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State of
their jurisdiction detailing the general purposes and powers of their association.
In general, such articles of incorporation are not as detailed as the CCRs. For a
discussion of the distinction between articles of incorporation/declarations and
bylaws, see HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 32-33.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Or PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.4 (2000).
37. 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
38. Id. at 1282 (citation omitted).
39. See Mission Shores Ass'n v. Pheil, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1O8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (up-
holding a reduction of the percentage of votes necessary to amend a CCR and
finding "reasonable" an amendment thereof that restricted a unit owner's ability
194
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The day-to-day provision of services, collection of association dues, and en-
forcement of rules are managed by the "condominium board." Board members
are elected exclusively by and from among association members. 4' Critical for
purposes of this Note, votes to amend CCRs and bylaws, as well as to elect
members of the board, are typically allocated on a basis proportional to owner-
ship in the community,42 not residency. Renters do not have a vote in the elec-
tion of board members and thus do not have a voice with respect to changes in
the CCRs and bylaws or the day-to-day governance of the condominium and its
common property.
3. Financing and Enforcement in a Condominium
A feature of all condominiums is the obligation of their owners to pay asso-
ciation dues. Condominium associations have "the power to raise the funds
reasonably necessary to carry out [their] functions by levying assessments
against the individually owned property in the community and by charging fees
for services or for the use of common property."43 The power of community as-
sociations to levy such private taxes on their members is controversial and can
lead to a variety of problems between individual unit owners and the collective
association or board.44
to lease her property for certain periods of time); Villas West of Willowridge
Homeowners Ass'n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 20o8) (upholding a cove-
nant prohibiting the renting of individual units because the association asserted a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the covenant, stating that the exclusion
of renters helped maintain property values because renters did not maintain
homes as well as owners).
40. See Cohan v. Riverside Park Place Condo. Ass'n, 365 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985) (allowing members of a condominium association board to inspect the
common and limited common elements of a unit).
41. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 7 18.112(2)(d)(1) (2008) ("Any unit owner desiring to be a
candidate for board membership shall comply with subparagraph 3.") (emphasis
added); UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107 cmt. 7, 7 U.L.A. 291
(2008) ("[T]he declaration might provide that each unit owner would have an
equal vote for the election of the Board of Directors.") (emphasis added); HYATT &
FRENCH, supra note 20, at 172 ("Traditionally... tenants have not been given the
right to vote, serve on committees or boards, or otherwise participate in commu-
nity governance.").
42. Votes are usually allocated on a one-to-one basis for every unit owned, but in cer-
tain circumstances voting rights are allocated by square footage or some other
proportional metric of ownership. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVI-
TUDES § 6.17 & cmt. a (2000).
43. Id. § 6.5. Certain statutes, furthermore, explicitly establish the obligation to pay
assessment fees.
44. See, e.g., Forest Villas Condo. Ass'n v. Camerio, 422 S.E.2d 884 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992); Rivers Edge Condo. Ass'n v. Rere, 568 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 199o).
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Condominium association dues are distinct from local property taxes,
which each unit owner must pay based on the assessed value of her overall in-
terest in the property. And, unlike property taxes, funds paid towards dues are
not deductible from federal or state income tax.45 Association dues typically are
spent on maintenance and improvements to common property and a variety of
services, such as private trash collection, window washing, or the installation of
new amenities. The affirmative covenant to pay dues, established in the condo-
minium declaration, is an independent covenant that runs with the land and is
binding on all successors-in-title . 6 Condominium governing documents typi-
cally provide for both "regular" and "special" assessments; the latter are "used
to deal with unanticipated expenses . . .,47
Condominium boards have the power to enforce association covenants and
rules, including the payment of dues, through a variety of means. These bodies
are authorized to place liens on unit owners' property; however, less severe me-
chanisms, such as the suspension of amenity privileges or voting rights, are also
available. 48
B. The Benefits of Condominium Ownership
The condominium form has at least four advantages for individuals who
wish to own residential property in an urban environment, as opposed to pur-
chasing a free-standing home-a limited and expensive commodity in most ur-
ban areas-or renting a unit in an apartment building. First, condominiums
create efficiencies by allowing for specialization in management functions and
the pooling of resources to provide "amenities and facilities ... that are valued
by the members.., but which none of them would find it worthwhile to fund
and manage on their own." 49 Condominium owners combine resources to pro-
vide for community-wide services, such as pool maintenance, gardening, or the
decoration of common areas. Economies of scale allow for the value maximiza-
tion of the property interest.
Second, and closely related to efficiency maximization, condominium asso-
ciations can be responsive to the local needs of their constituents. Ellickson, a
proponent of localized governance," views the rise of urban property owner-
45. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 271.
46. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d
793 (N.Y. 1938); see also David E. Grassmick, Minding the Neighbor's Business: Just
How Far Can Condominium Owners' Associations Go in Deciding Who Can Move
into the Building?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 185,187-88.
47. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 273.
48. Id. at 303-04.
49. Fennell, supra note 12, at 841-42.
50. See e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J.
75, 82 (1998) (finding that "[s]mall institutions may outperform larger ones for a
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ship associations as a positive development analogous to the role of municipal
governments. The voluntary nature of private condominium associations, in
which unit owners consciously opt into the governance regime "enables house-
holds that have clustered their activities in a territorially defined area to enforce
rules of conduct, to provide 'public goods' ... and to pursue other common
goals they could not achieve without some form of potentially coercive central
authority."" This benefit can take the form of "social or associational" gains,
achieved through covenants that "serve a population-screening function." '
Third, condominiums allow property owners to exhibit specialized prefer-
ences, enforcing idiosyncratic covenants that the majority deems optimal."
These specialized preferences may be relatively superficial in nature, such as re-
quirements restricting the varieties of trees an owner may plant.5 4 On the other
hand, restrictions may implicate core incidents of ownership. For instance, as
noted above, the CCR of a given condominium may restrict a unit owner's right
to keep pets55 or allow association members to search a unit for CCR viola-
tions 6-- activities that are considered part of the property owner's gatekeeper
authority.
Fourth, the condominium's hybrid property form provides for commu-
nity-wide services and aesthetic preferences while simultaneously allowing unit
owners to enact their personal preferences within individual units. This "cus-
tomization advantage" allows a unit owner to, for instance, remodel her kitchen
while reaping the benefits of standardization in common areas. Renters in man-
aged apartment complexes typically will be unable to make substantial changes
to their individual units either because the terms of their leases prohibit the
practice or because insufficient incentive exists for landlords to make custom-
ized changes due to the relatively short residency of the average tenant.
number of reasons. First, micro-institutions seem to be efficiently scaled to pro-
duce the most localized varieties of public goods.").
51. Ellickson, supra note 5, at 1519-20.
52. Fennell, supra note 12, at 842.
53. See id. at 843 (referring to this concept as "premium ambience" and stating that
"[rlesidents in private developments purchase premium ambience by ceding
property rights of their own, both directly through acceptance of reciprocal re-
strictions on their own land, and indirectly through the installation of a govern-
ance regime with the power to alter and enforce the prevailing land use con-
trols").
54. See, e.g., Ironwood Owners Ass'n IX v. Solomon, 224 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (finding that the removal of palm trees would have been reasonable if the
association had followed its own procedures and processes).
55. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) (upholding
a covenant disallowing pets inside condominium units).
56. See Cohan v. Riverside Park Place Condo. Ass'n, 356 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985).
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C. Sources of Law Governing Condominiums
Common-interest communities exercise a great deal of control over their
members, but this control is not limitless. The law of servitudes, state condo-
minium statutes, and the promulgations of bodies such as the National Confer-
ence of Commissioner on Uniform State Laws all shape the legal framework
within which condominium associations operate. 7 Condominium statutes are
particularly significant because they may set specific limits on home owners' use
of their property, the actions of condominium associations, and the governance
structure of the association."
Condominiums are a blend of property and contract law. The declaration,
CCR, and bylaws are the primary sources of law that govern the relationship
among association members.5 9 Courts typically enforce condominium cove-
nants, viewing them as "an agreement to refrain from a particular use of land
[that] is subject to contract principles, under which courts try to 'effectuate the
legitimate desires of the covenanting parties.""'6'
Condominiums, furthermore, are subject to state statutes. Every state has at
least one statute governing the practice of condominiums or common-interest
communities. As a result, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated a number of model acts designed to bring uni-
formity to the statutes governing these property forms.61 The statutory treat-
ment of condominium associations will be considered in Part III. For now, it
suffices to say that as condominium ownership has increased across the coun-
try, so too has the substantive scope of condominium statutes.
Finally, despite the proliferation of statutes governing condominium asso-
ciations, the common law has played an important role in determining the
standards of judicial review applicable to association and board actions as well
as the legality of condominium covenants. The courts, generally speaking, are
highly deferential to certain decisions of condominium associations and boards.
In determining whether an association has abused its power, courts analogize to
other areas of law, the standards of which have been imported into the condo-
minium context.62 Some courts have looked to public law or constitutional
principles to guide their decision-making; however, because ownership in a
57. See Fennell, supra note 12, at 837.
58. Id.
59. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 177.
6o. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1286 (quoting Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 211 P.2d 302
(Cal. 1949)).
61. See infra Section III.A.
62. See Natelson, supra note 33, at 48-49.
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condominium complex is considered to be a reasoned choice, whereas mem-
bership in a body politic is not, public law standards largely are disregarded."
Instead, the courts have settled on two standards of review: the business
judgment rule and a reasonableness standard. The business judgment rule6 4 is
commonly applied in "cases arising from the Board's exercise of its business re-
sponsibilities."6 In Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp., the New
York Court of Appeals held that "the business judgment rule furnishes the cor-
rect standard of review"66 when determining the legality of a use restriction im-
posed on an owner by the association. In Levandusky, a resident of a coopera-
tive-a closely related form of community association property-sought to
remodel his kitchen. The proposed remodeling required that the resident move
a steam pipe in his unit, which, if done without association approval, would be
in violation of Levandusky's lease. Although informed by an engineer that mov-
ing the steam pipe would be technically feasible, the association issued a stop
work order that led to litigation between the parties.6"
Initially, the trial court granted Levandusky's petition and annulled the stop
work order. After balancing the hardship of reversing the work completed on
Levandusky's kitchen against the harm to the building, the court determined
that the association's work stop request was "arbitrary and capricious." The
court reversed its decision on rehearing and Levandusky appealed.6"
Analogizing to the decisions of corporate directors, the Court of Appeals
held that the decisions of association boards should be upheld so long as they
were "taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful
and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes."6" In overruling the lower
court's decision, the court explicitly rejected a reasonableness standard for de-
termining the validity of association actions. The court noted that "unlike the
business judgment rule, which places on the owner seeking review the burden
63. See id. at 49 ("Precedents applicable to governmental decision-making do not ap-
ply very well.., because submission... is 'perfectly voluntary,' while submission
to government is imperfectly so.").
64. The "business judgment rule" is a standard derived from the law of corporations,
holding that the decisions of corporate directors and other governing officials will
be upheld unless arbitrary and capricious. This rule requires the presence of fraud
or lack of good faith in the conduct of a corporation's internal affairs before the
decisions of a board of directors can be questioned. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237
N.E.2d 776,779-8o (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
65. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 217.
66. 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (N.Y. 199o); see also UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP
ACT prefatory n.11, 17 U.L.A. 442 (1994).
67. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1319.
68. Id. at 1319-20.
69. Id. at 1321 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979)).
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to demonstrate a breach of the board's fiduciary duty-reasonableness review
requires the board to demonstrate that its decision was reasonable."7
Despite its rejection in Levandusky, courts widely apply the reasonableness
standard in evaluating association covenants.7 The applicability of a reason-
ableness standard to condominiums depends upon one's view of such commu-
nities.7  If one views entry into a condominium association as entirely volun-
tary, courts may find that the business judgment rule is appropriate. If,
however, the covenant under consideration implicates a core value of person-
hood, such as the freedom of expression, or the covenant restricts what the
court considers a fundamental incident of ownership, courts may subject the
association to the higher reasonableness standard.73 In determining when courts
apply each rule, the business judgment rule is "most traditionally seen in cases
arising from the board's exercise of its business responsibilities," whereas the
reasonableness standard is "seen in cases generally characterized as part of the
'governmental' powers of the community association." 74 There are no bright
line rules governing the application of these two standards. 75
70. Id. at 1322. For further discussion of the application of the business judgment rule
to community association decisions, see Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Community Associa-
tion Use Restrictions: Applying the Business Judgment Rule, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
653 (1988).
71. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 348 (1998); see also Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v.
Norman, 309 So. 2d 18o, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (relying on the reasonable-
ness standard to enforce a condominium covenant banning alcoholic beverages
from certain common areas).
72. See Hyatt, supra note 71, at 343 (highlighting the debate between those who believe
that although community associations resemble towns or municipalities, "they are
neither and should not be analyzed from the governmental perspective but rather
from the corporate perspective," and those who believe that applying the corpo-
rate governance principles is detrimental to residential communities and will fail
to protect "rights and political discourse within the community association").
73. See id. at 350-51; see also Hidden Harbour Estates, 393 So. 2d at 637 (finding that a
condominium's ban on dogs that exceed a certain height or weight requirement
was unreasonable).
74. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 217.
75. For additional material regarding the variety of defenses to the enforcement of
CCRs, rules, and regulations, see HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 426-36.
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II. THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN RESIDENTIAL LEASING AND MODERN
CONDOMINIUMS
Despite increasingly common practice, there is no evidence to suggest that
condominiums were designed as a secondary, income-generating property.76 In
fact, the condominium form is designed for the benefit of long-term owner-
residents. Nevertheless, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
notes that of the roughly 6.4 million occupied condominium units in America
today, about 2.1 million are occupied by renters? 7 This statistic not only reflects
increased reliance on condominiums as investment opportunities but also the
general trend of new property being developed in the common-interest com-
munity form! 1 In short, it is increasingly difficult for urban renters to lease out-
side of the condominium form.79
This Part argues that residential leasing in a condominium community is in
conceptual tension with the "traditional" leasehold property interest. Today,
about 2.1 million Americans are entering into residential leases-binding con-
tracts-without an adequate appreciation for how their property rights will dif-
fer from more traditional rental agreements. After considering the nature of
residential leases in a condominium, as opposed to other property environ-
ments, this Part critically examines the sufficiency of notice available to pro-
spective condominium lessees. This Part further proposes both that renting in a
condominium prevents the efficient allocation of renter preferences and that
the legal regime provides associations the opportunity to institute exploitative
covenants to the detriment of the renting class.
76. See generally Aaron M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condomin-
ium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1104-10 (1969) ("The
growth of this blend of private and communal housing has been spurred by many
causes. Foremost is the flight to the suburbs of affluent home buyers.... Only a
small portion of these home buyers could, however, afford to purchase a house
complete with its own extensive recreational facilities and green areas .... The fea-
sibility of constructing attractive one family homes by use of the cluster concept
and newer techniques of construction, at a cost which compares very favorably
with multi-family housing, can bring closer to realization the goal of the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968 and of the National Housing Act: to provide
homes for moderate income groups which have heretofore been unable to afford
to own their own homes.").
77. AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, supra note 2, at i.
78. See GARY W. ELDRED, MAKING MONEY WITH CONDOMINIUMS AND TOWNHOUSES
12 (2003).
79. See, e.g., Hyatt, supra note 71, at 351 (noting a "lack of alternative housing" due to
the increased popularity of common-interest communities in the marketplace).
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A. The Traditional Leasehold Interest Versus Residential Leasing in Condo-
miniums
The property form has evolved considerably since its feudal origins;"° nev-
ertheless, fundamental characteristics remain. Lord Templeman's famous opin-
ion in Street v. Mountfords' succinctly captures the essence of a "traditional"
leasehold interest as "that arrangement which gives a person the right of exclu-
sive possession in land, for a term, at a rent. ' ' 2 Leaseholds, therefore, pass the ga-
tekeeper function commonly associated with fee simple ownership from the les-
sor to the lessee for a period of time. Subject to the requirement that a lessee
pay her rent, when a lessor rents a single-family detached home for a one-year
period, the lessor transfers the gatekeeper right subject to certain restrictions
provided, in advance, in the lease. This arrangement sounds in the traditional
conception of a leasehold interest in real property: a contract between the two
parties, and the two parties alone.
Leasing a unit in a managed apartment building or a single-family detached
home differs considerably from leasing a unit in a condominium. These varia-
tions in rights and privileges matter considerably when the property regime
provides insufficient notice to prospective lessees regarding differences that af-
fect the use and enjoyment of the property. This Section highlights some of
those distinctions.
1. The Duties and Privileges of Renters in a Condominium
Renters in a condominium complex are afforded some of the same rights
and privileges of the ownership class but also are subject to many of the same
duties and use restrictions. First, the covenants contained within the unit own-
er's deed generally run with the land,"3 which means that property use restric-
tions apply to the property itself, regardless of who lives in the unit. Therefore,
in addition to the lease terms governing the lessee's rights and obligations with-
in the "airspace of the unit," the lessee is subject to most, if not all, of the cove-
nants governing the ownership class.8 4 Second, renters in condominium asso-
80. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 3, at 546-48.
81. 11985] 1 A.C. 809 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
82. MARTIN DIXON, MODERN LAND LAW 197 (2005) (emphasis added); see also MER-
RILL & SMITH, supra note 3, at 742 ("Under a lease, possession of the property...
shifts from the lessor to the lessee. Thus, during the term of the lease, the lessee
acts as the general gatekeeper of the property, and can exercise the in rem rights of
exclusion that we associate with possession of property.").
83. WAYNE & HYATT, supra note 20, at io.
84. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1) (2008) ("[Elach... tenant and other invitee...
shall be governed by, and comply with the.., declaration, the documents creating
the association, and the association bylaws...."); see also UNIF. COMMON INTER-
EST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102(d), 7 U.L.A. 335 (1994).
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ciations are not members of the association and therefore do not typically have
a voice in condominium governance or a vote on the covenants to which they
are subject."s Whereas a landlord does not have the authority to unilaterally al-
ter terms in the middle of a lease, Condominium Boards and Associations can
pass binding CCR or bylaw amendments during a renter's residency term.
Third, not only do restrictive covenants apply to the lessee during his or her
tenancy, but the enforcement authority of the association applies equally to ten-
ants as to unit owners.8 6 Enforcement mechanisms vary. For instance, condo-
minium associations may hold a lessee liable for the damage caused to common
area property s7 Community associations also possess the power to evict lessees
for violations of community CCRs.s8
The standards of judicial review 9 also are thought to apply to renters. Ren-
ters, therefore, are protected-just as unit owners are-from facially discrimi-
natory or unreasonable covenants. Like the relatively low common law standard
that often determines covenant legality in the context of individual unit owners,
the business judgment rule standard may similarly govern the review of cove-
nants imposed upon renters. This is particularly true if the covenant is cast as
an exercise of the day-to-day business authority of the association board. In
those situations covenant and/or condominium policy changes that affect the
renter's interest in the property will be upheld regardless of whether the renter
anticipated such a change when signing the original lease.
2. The Renter as a Circumscribed Gatekeeper
One critical difference between a lessee in a condominium and a lessee
renting a single-family home is the former's circumscribed gatekeeper authority
during the period of tenancy. The renter of a condominium unit is subject to
the numerous covenants and bylaws of the association in addition to specific
lease terms negotiated between the renter and the individual unit owner. The
existence of a continuous, governing authority with the power to amend and
enforce the rules governing the common property of the condominium neces-
sarily limits a lessee's gatekeeper authority as understood in Lord Templeman's
opinion. It is of course possible for a lessor outside the condominium domain
to subject his or her lessee to numerous lease provisions that restrict gatekeeper
85. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-101, 7 U.L.A. 332 (1994) ("The
membership of the association at all times consists exclusively of all unit own-
ers.").
86. Id. § 3 -102(d); see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 5 21- 3 (d) (2006); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
605/9.2(a) (2009).
87. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-102(d), 7 U.L.A. 333 (1994).
88. See, e.g., Carter v. Willowrun Condo. Ass'n, 345 S.E.2d 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that the condominium association had a statutory right to evict the ten-
ant for violation of the governing documents or the association's rules).
89. See supra Section I.C.
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authority. The four corners of the lease agreement, however, bound such provi-
sions and provide explicit, ex ante notice.
This circumscribed gatekeeper authority results from a problem unique to
renting in a condominium, namely that the lessee, in effect, enters into two
agreements. Condominium owners hold their units in fee simple, but hold all
common areas as tenants in common subject to the requirements of the CCR
and the bylaws. Unit owners cannot transfer the full gatekeeper authority, be-
cause it is impossible for a lessee to gain a leasehold interest in the unit without
also requiring an interest in the common areas. The simplest illustration of this
idea is a lessee who rents a condominium unit on the second floor of the build-
ing. In order to access the unit the lessee must pass through the building lobby,
ascend the stairs, and walk down a hallway, all of which are common areas un-
der the control of the condominium board and association.
Thus, renters in a condominium do not negotiate a contract between A
(the lessee) and B (the lessor) whereby the incidents of fee simple ownership are
passed from B to A for a period of time. Instead, A negotiates a lease with B, but
B is not empowered to transfer fully the ownership interest in the common
property, property that must be accessed in order to enjoy the benefits of the
unit. A therefore does not receive the "exclusive right of possession" to which
Lord Templeman referred.
3. Multi-Party Contracting: Who Is My Landlord?
Another conceptual tension between traditional residential leasing and
condominium leasing is that the identity of the landlord in the latter remains
less clear. Traditionally, a renter leases property from the owner who in turn
becomes the renter's landlord. The owner transfers a possessory interest to the
renter, complete with gatekeeper authority, but often provides ongoing mana-
gerial functions either directly or through an agent, such as a property man-
agement company. This arrangement is commonplace. A renter will call his or
her landlord if, for instance, the sink malfunctions. The unique structure of
condominium ownership as a blend of both fee simple and common ownership
forms nevertheless obscures the notion of the unit owner as "landlord" in a
condominium.
Condominium associations require, for the most part, that unit owners re-
spond to the needs of their tenants with respect to problems arising from the
unit, such as a leaky kitchen faucet. Associations, however, do not necessarily
specify how the lessee should address problems that arise outside the unit's four
walls. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many unit owners, particu-
larly those who purchased condominiums as investment properties, are absen-
tee landlords residing elsewhere, perhaps even in another jurisdiction. If a lessee
wishes to rectify a problem regarding an aspect of the common property, the
tenant may have to rely largely on the unit owner-the bona fide member of
the association-unless there is a mechanism through which the lessee can in-
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teract with the condominium board.9° The ownership class certainly maintains
a vested interest in correcting problems with the common property, because
they use it alongside renters. If, however, certain common property areas are
utilized more frequently by renters, the condominium board, which is com-
prised exclusively of owners living in the building, may be less inclined to re-
solve problems affecting that property relative to other areas.
4. Information Asymmetry
Related to the nebulous landlord-tenant relationship, lessees in a condo-
minium have relatively less access to information ex ante than prospective rent-
ers in an apartment building. First, reputational information about the landlord
is easily accessible in an apartment complex, as each resident shares the same
landlord-tenant relationship. A prospective lessee may inquire about the build-
ing and services from current residents, all of whom have some experience with
the singular landlord. In a condominium setting, however, prospective lessees
gain little insight about their landlord by conferring with other tenants in the
building, as the landlord-tenant relationship in a condominium is much more
individual in nature. In a condominium building comprised of one hundred
units, fifty of which are occupied by renters, each renter may have a different
landlord. The unit owners, furthermore, may not live in close proximity to the
condominium and may never meet their prospective tenants face-to-face.
Prospective lessees in an apartment can obtain informal clues that provide
information about the likely characteristics of the building owner or manager as
landlord. A prospective tenant can, in examining multiple units, better judge
the responsiveness of the apartment owner and notice building-wide defects
and in turn draw reasonable conclusions about the prospective lessee's renting
experience if they were to choose that property.
B. Insufficiency of Notice
Notice is inextricably linked to one's understanding of consent. The sub-
stance and scope of a condominium association's powers are vast, and it often is
the case that individuals who purchase condominiums are not fully aware of the
governance structure and servitude regime in which they invest.9 This Section
9o. See, e.g., Frisch v. Bellmarc Mgmt., Inc., 597 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (App. Div. 1993)
(holding that the lessee's warranty of habitability does not apply to condominium
associations or boards because "condominium ownership is a form of fee owner-
ship of property, and not a leasehold interest involving a landlord-tenant relation-
ship").
91. See Scott E. Mollen, Alternate Dispute Resolution of Condominium and Cooperative
Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 75, 79 (1999) ("Unfortunately, purchasers often
'gloss over' restrictions that directly impact their private use and enjoyment of the
unit and the common areas within the building or community.").
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posits that renters, who are equally subject to the governance and servitude re-
gime of the condominium, receive even less notice than purchasers.
There is reason to believe that considerable ignorance persists among pur-
chasers in the marketplace.0 2 As Scott E. Mollen observes:
Many unit purchasers have previously lived in rental apartments or
private homes and have never experienced the types of restrictions im-
posed upon them in a condo .... Accordingly, many purchasers do
not focus upon such restrictions until after they have sold or vacated
their prior residence ... and settled into their new home. 93
Ignorance of the condominium form also follows from the fact that per-
haps the "most common defense of nonpayment of assessments is the argument
that the owner did not know about it, that she was not told of it when she pur-
chased. '94 These defenses typically fail on the grounds that, even in the absence
of express notice of CCRs at the time of conveyance, purchasers have ample
constructive notice, as common-interest community declarations and CCRs are
recorded.95
Relying on constructive notice to enforce servitudes against an "ignorance
defense" makes legal and practical sense. Individuals purchasing homes in a
condominium will, in the process of determining the status of title, come across
the declaration and the CCR document. Although these documents together do
not necessarily provide the entire picture (since, for example, bylaws need not
be recorded), 96 they constitute a sufficient prompt for prospective owners to in-
vestigate the association and its property covenants in further detail. In this re-
spect, purchasers consent to the rules and regulations that govern property
owners in the community as well as the association's enforcement authority.
Notice is critical to the underlying legality of the rights and duties granted to
92. See Natelson, supra note 33, at 62 (citing Vivian Walker, Striking the Balance: The
Development of Social Control in Condominium Associations (June 1984) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with the Yale Law
& Policy Review) (finding, based on an empirical study of the Illinois condomin-
ium market, that few condominium unit purchasers adequately understand the
effects of governing documents prior to purchase). But see STEVEN WILLIAMSON &
RONALD ADAMS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONDOMINIUMS: AN EXPLORATORY
STUDY OF CONDOMINIUM OWNERS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA (1987) (finding
based, on an empirical study of the Florida condominium market, that knowledge
of the servitude regime was a primary reason why unit owners purchased their
condominiums).
93. Mollen, supra note 91, at 79-80.
94. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 304.
95. See Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson, 906 P.2d 1314, 1328 (Cal. 1995)
("We merely reject the unexamined assumption that the intent of the purchaser,
and therefore the agreement itself, must be expressed in the deed rather than be
implied from the purchase with knowledge of the recorded restrictions.").
96. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 32.
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condominium associations and their boards. Robert G. Natelson observes that
"[m]odern courts often justify servitude provisions, including grants of discre-
tionary power to associations, on the basis that members consented to those
provisions when they purchased their units."97 The basic idea is that buyers
should not be bound to the terms of a covenant of which they were not aware.
Scholars disagree as to whether the recordation system 98 provides adequate
notice of servitudes to buyers. Gregory Alexander argues that the recordation
system is an insufficient proxy for determining a buyer's consent to property
governed by servitudes. He states that "[sleveral reasons make notice alone an
insufficient guarantee of choice. One immediate reason, the purchaser who
acted without actual notice that the land she purchased was affected with an ob-
ligation may still be held to have had notice."99 Alexander is particularly wary of
constructive notice: "If we base an inference of consent on this type of notice we
greatly diminish the meaning, and the normative power, of consent."' 0
Richard Epstein, on the other hand, strongly supports the recordation sys-
tem as a sufficient guarantee of notice regarding condominium covenants, stat-
ing that "[t]he system of recordation is an indispensable aid for the effective use
of any form of covenant."'' He believes, furthermore, that "the recording sys-
tem renders unnecessary many of the arcane features of the law of covenants,"
such as the requirement that they "touch and concern" the land.1"2 In consider-
ing the potential "gaps" in information that exist even when recordation is the
norm, Epstein notes that in certain cases "the rules of 'inquiry notice' may re-
97. Natelson, supra note 33, at 54.
98. The "recordation system" is a term of art in property law that refers to the system
of public records that provides the world with constructive notice regarding the
transfer of title in real property. For a detailed discussion of the benefits and
drawbacks of the recordation system, see Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, In-
formation, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 305-06
(1984) ("The recording system has the effect of reducing the uncertainty sur-
rounding a transfer of real property without undermining the consensual nature
of those transfers.... But not all types of property are equally suited to an infor-
mational system based on files.").
99. Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 883, 892 (1988).
loo. Id. at 893.
ioi. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 908
(1988).
102. Id. at 909. Covenants that "touch and concern" are either restrictive or affirmative
covenants that burden or benefit subsequent owners. The covenant applies to the
use of real property and attaches to that property so as to similarly affect all own-
ers in the future.
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quire purchasers under common building plans to draw inferences of covenants
that are not recorded."' °3
Natelson criticizes the differing standards of adequate consent to a servi-
tude regime as espoused by both Epstein and Alexander. Natelson believes that
Alexander sets "unrealistic standards for acceptance," whereas Epstein "overes-
timates the power of legal notice to bring facts to the attention of the unit pur-
chaser."'1 4 Natelson also describes many recordation systems as so "poorly or-
ganized," "overloaded," and "incompetently operated as to be of limited
utility." 05
More fundamentally, Natelson posits that one does not "assent" to a servi-
tude regime merely because it was possible to learn that it exists. Rather, one as-
sents to a situation or condition "when one affirmatively accepts it while know-
ing of it or, although ignorant of the details, makes a conscious decision to
proceed without information that one knows to be available at little effort or
cost." '' Natelson's characterization is adopted here. Effective consent therefore
requires actual notice of critical facts, including the existence of a scheme of
land governance, the existence of a condominium association, the content of
regulations on the date of purchase, and the scope of the association's power to
alter the regulatory regime in the future. 7
Whether or not recordation notice and inquiry notice provide prospective
condominium purchasers with adequate notice remains an open question.
These theories of notice clearly do not provide prospective renters with ade-
quate notice. In an urban setting, for instance, distinguishing a high-rise apart-
ment building from a condominium complex according to architectural style is
an often fruitless exercise. Therefore, a prospective renter might not be subject
to inquiry notice based on the design of the property. Renters also do not ordi-
narily comb the public record to examine the title of the individual from whom
they lease the property. As a result, the argument that recordation provides con-
structive notice does not apply with equal force to renters.
In light of the uncertainty evidenced among buyers and the inapplicability
of inquiry and recordation notice to renters, one might reasonably infer that the
level of notice available to renters entering a condominium is less than that
available to owners. This insufficiency of notice is a serious concern that ex-
tends beyond normative desires to ensure that people adequately consent to a
servitude regime or the authority of private democracy.
103. Id. at 911; see, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (enforcing an
implied covenant).
104. Natelson, supra note 33, at 56.
105. Id. at 59.
1o6. Id. at 59-6o.
107. Id. at 61.
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C. The Impact of Insufficient Notice on Condominium Lessees
The economic goals and preferences of the renter will not always coincide
with the long-term interests of the unit owner. This is, in fact, one of the pri-
mary arguments made against extending association voting rights to tenants.18
The critiques of common-interest community practices therefore focus on
principles of fairness, equal representation, and constitutional rights by analo-
gizing the rule-making and enforcement power of the condominium associa-
tion to that of a local government.Y9 This Section advances two additional cri-
tiques heretofore unexamined in the literature. First, due to insufficient notice,
the ability of condominium associations to subject renters to a changing cove-
nant regime over the course of their tenancy prevents renters from efficiently
realizing their preferences in the housing market. Second, and more closely re-
lated to the equal representation and fairness critiques, the condominium
governance regime, subject to the business judgment rule standard, allows unit
owners to institute exploitative covenants against lessees.
1. Preference Inefficiency
Lessees are aware of the privileges, duties, restrictions, and amenities guar-
anteed by their lease contract when renting in an apartment complex. When
choosing where to live, renters therefore can calculate how much they wish to
pay in light of certain amenities, services, or use restrictions imposed by the
lease agreement. Renters generally are assured by their lease agreement that
their living conditions will remain constant, and, if the terms of the lease are
breached, the renter reserves remedial options predicated on the model of de-
pendent covenants. Renters in a condominium setting have no such ex ante
guarantee. Even assuming that renters possess sufficient notice of all covenants
and use restrictions at the time of lease signing, which, as argued in Section II.B,
is an unrealistic assumption, "[c]hanges in the CC&Rs are possible ... through
amendment procedures set out in the declaration itself.... The result is a two-
tiered set of restrictions: those initially contained in the CC&Rs that were part of
the declaration and new restrictions adopted later."11°
Because renters in a condominium are subject to the same covenants and
use restrictions as unit owners, the possibility that such restrictions will change
during the period of tenancy-without renters having a vote in such change-
makes it very difficult for renters to realize their preferences in the housing
market. Obligation to altered property restrictions chosen by the ownership
class is not problematic per se; however, without sufficient notice prospective
lo8. HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 20, at 172.
lo9. These critiques focus on individual unit owners under the authority of the con-
dominium association; however, these critiques might apply equally to lessees
within the condominium.
11o. Fennell, supra note 12, at 838.
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renters cannot factor covenant and amenity fluidity into their market calcula-
tion. In this respect, notice is very important. Natelson states that a purchaser of
a condominium unit, who has knowledge of its owners association's discretion-
ary powers, accepts "the risk that the power may be used in a way that benefits
the commonality but harms the individual."... Notice that land use restrictions
may change at any time allows purchasers to factor such risk into their decisions
whether or not to purchase a unit. Although a tenant may be aware of certain
land use restrictions at the date of signing, she nevertheless may be unaware
that those restrictions can change halfway through the lease term.
Consider a simple example. T. Woods wishes to lease a unit in an urban,
high-rise building for one year. Among the amenities that Woods prefers is a
putting green. There are two buildings in the city that have rooftop putting
greens: One is a traditional apartment complex, and the other is a condomin-
ium. Mr. Woods-an average, unsophisticated renter-is unaware of the cove-
nant regime and governance structure of the condominium and leases a unit in
the condominium as opposed to the apartment complex. The day after Mr.
Woods moves into his unit the association votes to transform the rooftop put-
ting green into a garden. In this case, the association's action is good business
judgment, reasonable, and taken pursuant to the declaration and bylaws. Al-
though Mr. Woods no longer derives nearly as much utility from the property,
he nevertheless is bound to remain for the period of his tenancy.
Consider another tenant with specific amenity preferences. M. Phelps de-
sires that his residence include a pool. All else equal, Phelps values a residential
lease that includes pool access at siooo per month and a lease without pool ac-
cess at $500 per month. Mr. Phelps's rental market includes two leasing options
with pools, one managed apartment building and one condominium, each leas-
ing units for siooo per month. Without notice of the possibility that property
uses, such as pool access, can be restricted or eliminated in a condominium,
Mr. Phelps signs a one-year lease in the condominium. The next month the as-
sociation votes to remove the pool to free space for additional parking, an
amenity from which Mr. Phelps derives no measurable utility. Fifty percent of
the property's subjective value has been eliminated immediately; meanwhile,
Mr. Phelps is obligated to remain in the unit.
Prospective tenants who are fully informed regarding the governance struc-
ture and the potential for changes in the amenities, services, or covenant regime
can more accurately factor into their valuation the risk associated with condo-
minium association leasing. Thus, if Phelps is extremely risk averse, he always
will choose an apartment complex in which amenities and property use restric-
tions remain static for the life of the lease. If, alternatively, he has an intermedi-
ate risk profile, Phelps may be willing to lease a unit in a condominium, if and
only if the monthly rent is discounted to, say, $750. From a renter's perspective,
a condominium system without adequate notice is at best inefficient and at
worst a scheme through which inadequately informed renters may be deprived
iii. Natelson, supra note 33, at 67.
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of the value of their investment while living subject to a governance structure in
which they have no voice.
2. Rent-Seeking Activity
The inability of lessees to guarantee their preferences for the duration of
their lease agreement is the lesser evil along the continuum of potential ills. Be-
cause the interests of lessees and unit owners often are not aligned, the power
asymmetry-reinforced by insufficient notice-creates opportunities for con-
dominium associations to extract economic rents"' not explicitly stated in the
lease between the lessee and the unit owner. As noted in Section II.C, the stan-
dards that govern the rules and regulations associations may impose on their
members provide associations with significant latitude. A covenant may be
struck down under a reasonableness standard if it is found to be unconscion-
able or implicative of a fundamental value of personhood or property owner-
ship. Board decisions that are framed as an exercise of commercial or day-to-
day business authority, however, generally are upheld pursuant to the business
judgment rule whereby the association need only articulate a reasonable busi-
ness justification for imposing the covenant."'
A common form of rent seeking is the imposition of a "move-in/out" fee. A
revenue-generating device for condominium associations, move-in/out fees
disproportionately target lessees because they have a higher rate of turnover in a
condominium relative to unit owners. These fees may be instituted halfway
through a renter's lease agreement by amending the bylaws or by passing a
regulatory judgment at the level of the condominium board."4 The renter's
lease agreement likely will contain a provision stating the renter's obligation to
abide by the changing rules of the association, without explicitly referencing
such fees. Tenants often are unaware that they are liable for such payments at
the end of their lease; however, "[i] n the same way that a tenant must dispose of
his garbage in accordance with the condominium's guidelines, or comply with
the limitations on the use of the common areas, he would have to pay the
move-out fee.... "115
112. "Economic rent" refers to "a payment for the services of an economic resource
which is not necessary as an incentive for its production." JOHN BLACK, A Dic-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS 137 (1997). In the context of condominiums it refers to
the opportunistic charge of monies to renters that are unnecessary for the produc-
tion of the service that the renters consume.
113. See supra Section II.C.
114. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Gateway Georgetown Condo. Ass'n, 482 A.2d 1248, 1249
(D.C. 1984) ("[T]he Association instituted a 'move-in/move-out fee' and levied it
against several ... tenants, [and the] appellant ... asserted that the assessment
was illegal .... ").
115. Posting of Jay Romano to Real Estate Q&A, http://realestateqa.blogs.nytimes.com/
20o8/07/18/paying-moving-out-fees-in-a-rental-in-a-condo (July 18, 2008 13:52
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III. THE STATUTORY TREATMENT OF RENTERS IN CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIA-
TIONS
Statutes are a critical source of law governing condominiums. The fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico all have enacted legislation de-
signed to govern the establishment, management, and dissolution of common-
interest communities, and most jurisdictions have passed condominium-
specific legislation. These statutes govern the legal operation of common-
interest communities, set boundaries on the types of use restrictions and cove-
nants that associations may impose upon their members, regulate the conver-
sion of other property forms into condominiums, and address a range of other
topics. Despite the broadening scope of condominium legislation, these statutes
largely ignore the role of lessees, and, in particular, lack a clear notice require-
ment for renters leasing condominium property. In fact, most references to ren-
ters in condominium units address covenants restricting the unit owner's ability
to transfer possessory interest in their property. The perspective of the renter is
almost non-existent.
This Part will briefly survey the statutory landscape, highlighting the inade-
quacy of current legislation. Beginning with the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act of 1994 (UCIOA), the subsequent Section examines the condo-
minium statutes of a limited number of additional states, considering the man-
ner in which they address the role of lessees in condominium communities and
what, if any, notice is required prior to leasing a unit. The findings in this Part
further demonstrate the need for the statutory notice requirement proposed in
the Conclusion.
A. The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 1994
The UCIOA, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, "is a comprehensive act that governs the formation, man-
agement, and termination of a common interest community, whether that
community is a condominium, planned community, or real estate coopera-
tive.""' 6 The UCIOA, which has been adopted by eight states,'7 superseded and
EDT); see also Reynolds, 482 A.2d at 1252 (upholding the imposition of a move-
in/move-out fee upon tenants).
116. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Com-
mon Interest Ownership Act (1994): Summary, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
uniformactsummaries/uniformacts-s-ucioa94.asp.
117. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, Vermont, and
West Virginia have all adopted the UCIOA. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWN-
ERSHIP ACT (1994); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucioa.asp
(last visited Dec. 3, 2009). In 2008, the National Conference of Commissioners on
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subsumed many older uniform acts, including the Uniform Condominium Act
(UCA)." 8 The UCIGA originated, in part, because developers evaded the re-
quirements of the UCA. According to the chair of the UCIOA drafting commit-
tee, developers in UCA states were creating "planned communities" and "vest-
ing title to the elements [of the community] in the Association since the
definition of condominiums under the condominium act excluded that."" 9 The
Commission on Uniform State Laws responded by creating the Planned Com-
munity Act and the Real Estate Co-op Act. 2° Eventually, the disparate acts were
combined to create the UCIOA, which is designed to govern all forms of com-
munity property.'
The UCIOA was drafted with the needs of unit owners and developers in
mind and therefore largely ignores the problems associated with renters of con-
dominium units. Section 3-11o(c), one of the few sections pertaining to lessors,
governs the allocation and casting of votes within the condominium associa-
tion. That section states in pertinent part:
If the declaration requires that votes on specified matters affecting the
common interest community be cast by lessees rather than unit owners
of leased units: (i) the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) apply to
lessees as if they were unit owners; (ii) unit owners who have leased
their units to other persons may not cast votes on those specified mat-
ters; and (iii) lessees are entitled to notice of meetings, access to re-
cords, and other rights respecting those matters as if they were unit
owners.1 22
The comments state that "[s]ubsection (c) addresses an increasingly important
matter in the governance of common interest communities: the role of tenants
occupying units owned by investors or other persons.' 2' 3 Interestingly, despite
the fact that "most present statutes require voting by unit owners," the UCIOA
Uniform State Laws passed a series of amendments to the UCIOA, which have
been adopted by Delaware and are pending adoption in other states.
118. The Uniform Condominium Act of 198o has been adopted by the following twelve
states: Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts
About the Uniform Condominium Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Updatel
uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-uca.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2009).
119. Carl Lisman, Chair of the Drafting Comm. of the Unif. Common Interest Owner-
ship Act, Remarks Before the Maryland Task Force on Common Ownership




122. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-110(c) (1994).
123. Id. § 3-110 cmt.
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implicitly maintains that providing lessees with the right to vote on certain mat-
ters affecting day-to-day operations is "desirable," because lessees "may have a
greater interest than the lessors and because it is desirable to have lessees feel
they are an integral part of the common interest community."'2 The possibility
of providing condominium renters with complete voting rights is certainly a
minority view that this Note does not advocate fully. The UCIOA nevertheless
explicitly recognizes the potential for tensions between lessees and condomin-
ium associations: a recognition not present in any of the state statutes examined
below.
The UCIOA reinforces the commonly understood authorities of the con-
dominium association with respect to leasing and regulation of common areas,
permitting the association to "grant easements, leases, licenses, and concessions
through or over the common elements."' 25 The Act addresses the association's
enforcement authority with regard to renters, specifically stating that the asso-
ciation may "after giving notice to the tenant.., and an opportunity to be
heard, levy reasonable fines against the tenant for the violation" of the "declara-
tion, bylaws, or rules and regulations of the association. '1"6 It also states that the
association may "enforce any other rights against the tenant for the violation
which the unit owner as landlord could lawfully have exercised under the lease
or which the association could lawfully have exercised directly against the unit
owner, or both."127
Unfortunately, the UCOIA does not require individual unit owners to no-
tify prospective tenants expressly of these broad authorities, or even of the very
existence of the association. The UCIOA reinforces the fact that, among unit
owners, recordation serves as constructive notice of a unit owner's rights."8 The
Act, however, provides neither a standard for transferring possessory interest to
renters nor ex ante notice requirements regarding the declaration, CCRs, or by-
laws.
Although the UCOIA does not address notice with regard to tenants, it
clearly contemplates the difficulty of notice in the context of unit owners. In
addressing purchaser protections, the Act, after requiring that a list of informa-
tion be provided to prospective unit purchasers, states:
The best "consumer protection" that the law can provide to any pur-
chaser is to insure that he has an opportunity to acquire an under-
standing of the nature of the products which he is purchasing. Such a
result is difficult to achieve, however, in the case of the common inter-
124. Id.
125. Id. § 3-102(a)(9).
126. Id. § 3-102(d)(2).
127. Id. § 3-102(d)(3).
128. Id. § 1-105 cmt. 4.
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est community purchaser because of the complex nature of the bundle
of rights and obligations which each unit owner obtains. 2 9
Most of the obligations of the unit owners are transferred to the lessee when
renting. It is curious, therefore, that the UCOIA does not consider the provision
of equal notice between the two classes of residents.
B. Select State Condominium Statutes
Section III.B analyzes the treatment (or non-treatment) of renters in four
state condominium statutes. The states were selected due to their geographical
diversity from one another and the existence of at least one major urban cen-
ter-and various minor urban centers or suburban areas-that contain numer-
ous condominium properties.
1. New York
The New York Condominium Act' 3° (NYCA) explicitly references the dis-
closure requirements of leases for condominium units. According to the NYCA,
deeds and leases must include a description of the land, a date and page refer-
ence to the recordation of the declaration, the unit number, a statement regard-
ing the land's use, "[t]he common interest appertaining to the unit," and "[a] ny
further details which the grantor and grantee may deem desirable to set
forth.""' The Act also requires that the bylaws and any amendments to them be
recorded as amendments to the declaration.'32 New York is among the few states
to reference lease documentation requirements at all in its condominium law.
However, these limited requirements fail to provide prospective renters with
sufficient information, other than the deed and declaration's location in the
public record, which renters do not examine customarily.
With the exception of the minimalist lease disclosure requirements above,
the NYCA does not provide much in the way of guidance as to the role of rent-
ers in condominiums. Like most state condominium statutes, one of the
NYCA's few references to lessees is a provision addressing their duty to pay
rents directly to the condominium association when the absentee unit owner
defaults on his association dues. 33 Interestingly, in interpreting the NYCA, New
York courts have clarified the landlord problem raised in Subsection III.B.3 by
distinguishing the landlord-tenant relationship from the relationship between a
129. Id. § 4-103 cmt. 1.
130. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-d (McKinney 2006).
131. Id. § 339-0.
132. Id. § 339-u.
133. Id. § 339-kk ("If a non-occupying owner rents any dwelling unit to a rental tenant
and then fails to make payments due for common charges ... all rental payments
from the tenant shall be directly payable to the condominium association.").
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condominium lessee and the association. The court in Frisch v. Bellmarc Man-
agement, Inc., held that duties under the warranty of habitability-a common
law term for the presumptive guarantees that ensure certain standards of habi-
tability be provided to renters by landlords-do not apply to condominium as-
sociations or boards because "condominium ownership is a form of fee owner-
ship of property, and not a leasehold interest involving a landlord-tenant
relationship. "'34
2. Georgia
The Georgia Condominium Act 35 (GCA) is the relevant statute governing
the creation, operation, and termination of condominium property. The stat-
ute, however, does not contemplate the unique problems presented by lessees in
the condominium setting. The GCA does provide a detailed description of the
disclosure requirements that "shall apply only to the first bona fide sale of each
residential condominium unit for residential occupancy," ensuring that the
"seller has furnished to the prospective buyer the documents specified in this
subsection," including the declaration, CCRs, bylaws, information relating to
the governance regime, and a host of other relevant information. 13' 6 Regrettably,
the GCA does not mandate similar disclosure requirements to prospective ten-
ants.
3. Illinois
The Illinois Condominium Property Act (ICPA) governs the "the owner-
ship in and rights and responsibilities of parties under the condominium form
of ownership of property." 137 The ICPA does not require a detailed description
of the declaration, covenants, or bylaws in conveyance documents such as deeds
or leases. The law merely states that:
Every... lease... may legally describe a unit by its identifying number
or symbol as shown on the plat and as set forth in the declaration, and
every such description shall be deemed good and sufficient for all pur-
poses, and shall be deemed to... transfer ... the owner's correspond-
ing percentage of ownership in the common elements even though the
same is not expressly menticned or described therein.' 38
Instead, the statute mandates that the disclosure of the declaration, CCR, and
initial bylaws occurs only upon the first sale of a unit,'39 after which recordation
134. 597 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963 (App. Div. 1993).
135. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-70 (1991).
136. Id. § 44-3-11l(a)-(b).
137. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/1 (2009).
138. Id. 605/7.
139. See id. 605/22.
28:187 2009
PROPERTY FORMS IN TENSION
requirements provide notice of this information to subsequent purchasers or
lessees.14
°
The ICPA's discussion of renters is limited to the applicability of the decla-
ration, bylaws, and "rules and regulations that relate to the use of the individual
unit or the common elements," specifically that the governing documents,
rules, and regulations will apply "to any person leasing a unit and shall be
deemed to be incorporated in any lease executed. "' 4' The law requires in addi-
tion that a copy of any lease entered into by a unit owner be filed with the con-
dominium board. It also describes the association's authority to prevent the les-
see from occupying the unit, or to evict a tenant, if the owner fails to abide by
the covenants and regulations of the condominium regarding the leasing of
units.14' The association's authority over unit leasing is reinforced by language
explicitly exempting the condominium property form from "the rule against
perpetuities and the rule of property known as the rule restricting unreasonable
restraints on alienation," which according to the statute "shall not be applied to
defeat any of the provisions of this Act."143
4. Florida
The Florida Condominium Act' 44 (FCA) is among the most comprehensive
in the United States. The law's stated purposes are, first, "[to give statutory
recognition to the condominium form of ownership of real property" and, sec-
ond, "[t]o establish procedures for the creation, sale, and operation of condo-
miniums.' 45 The FCA considers the role of lessees in condominiums in greater
detail than the UCIOA. For instance, Florida's law explicitly transfers use rights
of all common property: "[A] tenant shall have all use rights in the association
property and those common elements otherwise readily available for use gener-
ally by unit owners and the unit owner shall not have such rights except as a
guest, unless such rights are waived in writing by the tenant." 46
The FCA requires the condominium association to keep on record a copy
of any lease agreement entered into by an association member.' 47 The law also
explicitly disfavors the application of a fee associated with the transfer of a
property interest. In cases when a fee is allowed, the actions of the association
are constrained and the fee must be recorded:
140. See id. 605/17.
141. Id. 6o5/i8-(n)(i).
142. Id. 6o 5/18-(n)(ii).
143. Id. 605/20.
144. FLA. STAT. § 718 (20o8).
145. Id. § 718.102.
146. Id. § 718.1o6(4).
147. Id. § 718.111(12)(a)(9).
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No charge shall be made by the association.., in connection with
the ... lease, sublease, or other transfer of a unit unless the association
is required to approve such transfer and a fee for such approval is pro-
vided for in the declaration, articles, or bylaws. Any such fee may be
preset, but in no event may such fee exceed sioo per applicant .... ,48
Of course, like every statute concerning the condominium property form, the
FCA applies the covenants and use regulations equally to owners and to lessees:
"[E]ach tenant.., shall comply with the provisions of, this chapter, the declara-
tion, the documents creating the association, and the association bylaws and the
provisions thereof shall be deemed expressly incorporated into any lease of a
unit. 149
The FCA envisions a greater degree of transparency in the transfer of con-
dominium units generally, and it contains provisions that consider renters'
needs and preferences. The statute comes close to the solution advocated by this
Note but for the omission of two words. The statute explicitly lists the disclo-
sure requirements of a unit owner prior to the sale of his or her unit:
Each prospective purchaser.., is entitled, at the seller's expense, to a
current copy of the declaration of condominium, articles of incorpora-
tion of the association, bylaws and rules of the association, financial in-
formation... and the document entitled "Frequently Asked Questions
and Answers." .. . [T]he prospective purchaser shall also be entitled to
receive from the seller a copy of a governance form. Such form shall be
provided by the division summarizing governance of condominium as-
sociations. 15°
If the section above began with the language "[e]ach prospective purchaser and
renter.., is entitled," renters in Florida would have significantly greater notice
of their rights and obligations as residents in a condominium.
CONCLUSION
With over 2.1 million renter-occupied units in condominiums, many of
which include multiple tenants and families, the problem of insufficient notice
is neither theoretical nor trivial. Rental market goods are not easily transferable
in every part of the country, and material and emotional costs associated with
moving can be significant. If we believe that confusion and information asym-
metry regarding the legal consequences of living in a condominium exists
among prospective home owners, then we should infer that prospective renters
are less aware of the details of the condominium form. Considering the ineffec-
tiveness of inquiry or constructive notice of covenants and servitudes in the les-
148. Id. § 7 18.112(2)(i). The section further states that associations may require a pro-
spective tenant to provide a security deposit not exceeding one month's rent in
order to cover damage to common property.
149. Id. § 718.303(1).
15o. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503(2)(a) (West 2009).
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see context, ensuring a basic level of understanding about the rights and duties
of a lessee in a condominium is critical if renters are to receive the full benefits
of their bargains.
When remedying the problems identified in Section II.D, it is important
not to undermine the many advantages of common-interest community prop-
erty. It also is undesirable to constrain the transfer of possessory interests in real
property. This Note, therefore, argues for a statutory notice requirement de-
signed to ensure that prospective renters are explicitly informed of the follow-
ing: the content of the declaration; the content of the CCR and bylaws at the
time of lease execution; the legal rights and duties of the condo association and
board; and the ways in which those entities can affect the renter's use and en-
joyment of the property throughout the lease.
Part V of Florida's Condominium Act-"Regulation and Disclosure Prior
to Sale of Residential Condominiums"-outlines the notice regime that ought
to apply to prospective condominium renters. 5 ' Part V of the Act, unfortu-
nately, applies only to prospective purchasers of condominium units. State leg-
islatures across the country should adopt the notice requirements of the Florida
Act and apply them equally to prospective purchasers and prospective renters.
The Florida Condominium Act mandates that homeowners provide pro-
spective buyers with all current information pertaining to the covenants, servi-
tudes, and legal structure of the condominium in which they are selling their
unit, including copies of the governance documents. 52 Recognizing that first-
time purchasers likely are unaware of the complex governance regime and legal
duties outlined in Section I.A, the Act states that "the prospective purchaser
shall also be entitled to receive from the seller a copy of a governance form.
Such form shall be provided by the division summarizing governance of con-
dominium associations.'"153
Florida's law also requires sellers to provide buyers with a document-to be
formatted and approved by the Division of Florida Condominiums, Time-
shares, and Mobile Homes-entitled "Frequently Asked Questions and An-
swers" (FAQA). The Florida Act's FAQA requirement, among other provisions,
must include, "in readable language," information regarding "voting rights and
unit use restrictions, including restrictions on leasing the leasing of a unit.1 54
Florida's FAQA requirement is useful because it provides prospective buyers
with a plain-language understanding of the potentially technical or convoluted
language of a servitude regime embodied in the declaration or CCR.
These notice requirements do not limit the types of covenants that condo-
minium associations can impose on unit owners-assuming such covenants are
otherwise legal. Rather, they simply ensure that prospective buyers are fully
aware of how their obligations and rights differ in a condominium setting as
151. See FLA. STAT. §§ 718.501-718.509 (2008).
152. See id. §§ 718.503(1)(b), 718.504.
153. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.503(2) (a) (West 2009).
154. FLA. STAT. § 718.504 (2008) (emphasis added).
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opposed to a single-family detached home owned in fee simple. The Florida Act
recognizes the importance of adequate notice when buying condominium
units. In addition to detailing what information sellers must provide prospec-
tive purchasers, the Act creates a "good faith obligation" to comply with the no-
tice requirements. " ' The Act, furthermore, creates an explicit right of action for
purchasers against sellers who publish "false or misleading information" about
the condominium unit and common property.'56
The notice requirements in the Florida Act should be incorporated into the
UCIOA and other state condominium statutes and should be applied equally to
those renting condominium units. This robust, statutory notice requirement is
the most efficient way to ensure renter preferences are realized while reserving
the governance and servitude structure that accrues benefits to unit owners.
The minimal ex ante costs associated with providing such notice presumably
are much less than the costs of ex post dispute resolution or litigation resulting
from an insufficient understanding of the legal regime governing condominium
lessees. Less measurable are the costs of acrimony between ownership and ren-
tal classes that ensue when lessees move into a condominium unaware of the
association's authority over them.5 7
Although the responsibility to provide notice must fall in part on the unit
owner who contracts with the lessee, the condominium association's authority
with respect to the common property counsels in favor of the condominium
association having a role in the leasing process. As described previously in Sub-
section II.A.3, the lessee's obligations are split between the unit owner, with
whom the lessee contracts to lease the unit, and the condominium association,
the existence of which the lessee is sometimes unaware until after the lease has
been signed. Condominiums may require that the association or the board ap-
prove prospective lessees, or at least require that the association is provided
with notice of new lessee residents, before a unit owner may lease his or her
property."58 The prospective lessee, however, may not be aware that such ap-
proval was required and thus is not necessarily "on notice" regarding the exis-
tence of the association.
Prospective renters should therefore be required to sign a consent agree-
ment produced by the condominium association. The agreement would ensure
that the renter has received, read, and understood the various statutorily re-
quired documents, including the FAQA, while also forging direct contact be-
155. See id. § 718.505.
156. Id. § 718.5o6.
157. See generally Mollen, supra note 91 (cataloguing several areas of contestation be-
tween community associations and unit owners arising from insufficient under-
standing of covenants and governance regimes).
158. See, e.g., Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (providing that the
condominium association may not withhold approval of a unit owner's proposed
lease unless the association is able to provide an alternative lessee acceptable to the
association and willing to lease on terms equally favorable to the unit owner).
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tween the renter and the association. Designing small measures that advance
understanding and dialogue between renters and associations can help amelio-
rate unforeseen disputes or problems. In fact, the Community Association In-
stitute, a national nonprofit organization representing the interests of condo-
minium developers and managers, has begun to advocate for greater
communication between renters and condominium associations and for more
rights for renters beyond those currently required by law.'59 Further empirical
research-beyond the scope of this Note-is required to determine the extent
to which norms or best practices have developed among community associa-
tions to ensure that prospective tenants are adequately informed and better in-
tegrated into the community. We know, for instance, that in certain cases rent-
ers are given voting rights, not because the law requires it, but because the
association finds co-existence more pleasant with a renting class that is not dis-
gruntled by the association's governance regime.6
This Note does not argue for the discontinuation of condominium prop-
erty, nor does it take the position that renters ought to receive power within
association governance on par with unit owners. Renters, furthermore, should
not be allowed to exit their leases every time the association votes to amend the
governing documents in a way that affects the renter's use and enjoyment of the
property. That would create an unhelpfully transient residential environment
and serve as a pretext for renters who may wish to leave their leases for other
reasons. It is, however, unrealistic to assume that the rental market in a given
location is sufficiently diverse and liquid that renters can easily locate rental op-
portunities outside of condominiums or that they can move without incurring
considerable costs.
Notice is the first and most important step in addressing the challenges
identified in Part II of this Note. Under an explicit statutory notice regime, pro-
spective renters will be aware of any servitude, fees, or land use restrictions in
existence at the time of lease execution. Furthermore, prospective lessees can
factor the uncertainty associated with the authorities of the governance regime
into the price they are willing to pay for residence in a condominium. In addi-
tion to securing legitimate consent to covenants, increased information ensures
that the market can more efficiently balance the residential preferences of rent-
ers in a market increasingly dominated by the condominium form.
159. See Press Release, Cmty. Ass'ns Inst., Prescription for Tenant/Owner Harmony
Published by CAI (Oct. 21, 1999), available at http://www.caionline.org/about/
press/Pages/PrescriptionforTenantOwnerHarmonyPublishedbyCAI.aspx.
16o. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-110, 7 U.L.A. 557 (1994) (not-
ing that common-interest community declarations may mandate that lessees vote
on certain matters instead of the non-resident unit owner).

